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This paper examines factors influencing impJementation and use of computer models that have been successfully
institutionalized as part of federal policy-making. It is based upon detailed case studies of two kinds of models that have
been widely assimilated and used in federal agencies—microanalytic simulation models and macroeconomic models. It
concludes that the most important influences on successful modeling are the means to do modeling (supply factors) and
the desire of bureaucrats and politicians to use model-generated information (demand factors). Of these, demand factors
are most important. The availability and promotion of computer models alone is insufficient to generate use, whereas
their political saliency is critical. Thus, where the means to do modeling are weak, but the desire to use models is strong,
government agencies invest heavily in the creation of new modeling efforts.
1. Models in the Policy Process
Between 1950 and 1970, most applications of op-erations research models were to operational
decision problems that had well-understood objectives
and conditions, and that were subject to formal
expression and rigorous analysis. Beginning in the late
1960s, there arose a serious effort to apply OR tech-
niques to the problems of public policy analysis
(Strauch 1974). Policy analysis problems differ from
operational problems in that unambiguous, rigorous
representations of the problems are very difficult to
construct. The fundamental objectives in policy prob-
lems are themselves unclear in many instances (Quade
1982). The gap between the need for formality and
rigor in mathematical modeling, and the fuzziness of
problems in real-world policy situations, has stimu-
lated considerable skepticism about the applicability
of models to policy problems (Churchman 1971, Hoos
1972, Brewer 1973, Brewer and Shubik 1979, Fromm,
Hamilton and Hamilton 1974, and GAO 1973). These
concerns are by no means unqiue to OR models; they
apply to all kinds of modeling efforts, from econo-
metric modeling to simulations of every sort. As Gass
(1983) points out, concern over the applicability
of models is merely one facet of a larger concern
about the applicability of system analytic approaches
generally.
These concerns deserve the attention of the mod-
eling community, for they illustrate in stark form the
inherent limits of model application. "Pure" ap-
proaches to modeling require formal expression and
rigor in every aspect of model building. The models
that result are so abstract and removed from the
realities of fuzzy political problems that they are al-
most certain to fail as tools for public policy-making.
But modeling need not be evaluated under such severe
constraints. Models can and do play significant roles
in public policy analysis and formulation (Greenber-
ger, Crenson and Crissey 1976, House and McLeod
1977, King 1984, Dutton and Kraemer 1985). These
instances of model use demonstrate that modeling
has something to offer. Rather than lamenting the
difficulties in applying models to the policy pro-
cess, researchers in modeling and in public policy
should focus on improving models as decision aids
(Gass 1983), and on improving policymakers' means
of using models to advantage in the policy proc-
ess (Greenberger, Crenson and Crissey; Dutton and
Kraemer).
This paper provides an overview of factors shown
to be important in two instances of successful imple-
mentation and use of policy models in U.S. federal
government agencies (King 1983, 1984; Kraemer et
al., forthcoming, 1986). The models studied are not
classical OR models, but they are clearly of the class
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of decision-aiding models outlined in Gass' 1983
framework for model validation and assessment. The
approach to assessment in our study is similar to those
suggested by Gass (1977), Kresge (1979) and Wood
(1980), but with a slightly different approach to the
task. Rather than using ad hoc methods for determin-
ing how a model might be useful in the policy process,
the study attempted to uncover the factors behind the
success of two kinds of models that have been widely
assimilated and used in federal agencies.
The objective of this paper is to examine the suc-
cessful implementation and use of models that have
become institutionalized as part of the policymaking
process. We will discuss the patterns of model use, the
relationships between implementation practices and
subsequent use, the conditions that affect policymak-
ers' acceptance of model results, and the effects of
model use on the policy process. We conclude with a
prognosis for policy-oriented modeling in the years
ahead.
2. Description of the Research and Methods
The Setting of Model Use
The federal government has supported development
of models for policy analysis since the 1960s, with
varied results (GAO 1979). Some models have secured
strong niches in federal agencies. Some have been
used one time and abandoned. Others died in transfer
from the developer to the user agency. Many models
that have survived to be incorporated into policymak-
ing processes have produced less than ideal results.
Frequently, the results of models have clouded and
confused the complex policy issues they were sup-
posed to help policymakers deal with. Occasionally,
models have proven most useful for applications never
intended by their developers. This mixed history of
success, together with the fact that modeling can be
very expensive, has caused some policymakers and
bureaucrats to back away from modeling efforts. It
has also discouraged some model builders from apply-
ing their talents to the challenge of public policy-
making. Given the misgivings of the critics of systems
analysis applications to public policy, it is a wonder
that there are any successful modeling systems in the
public policy arena.
The Nature of Modeling Success
In spite of problems in implementation, a number of
highly successful modeling systems are routinely used
in federal agencies. These constitute a natural labora-
tory for investigating what leads to success in model
implementation and use. Success of a model refers to
a number of outcomes that might occur within the
general modeling environment. Definitions about
what constitutes success or failure with models have
varied from multiattribute attitude measures (Bean et
al. 1975) and perceptions of use and utility (Manley
1975, Schultz and Slevin 1975), to intended willing-
ness to adopt an innovation (Souder et al. 1975) and
actual innovation implementation over time (Radnor,
Rubenstein and Tansik 1970). We adopted the meas-
ure of model use as the primary indicator of successful
implementation, focusing on two aspects of use: policy
use and political use (Fromm et al., Greenberger et
al.. Pack and Pack 1977a, b).
Policy use refers to the extent to which a model is
used explicitly and seriously to improve the quality or
flow of information available to policymakers in the
development of policies or programs, in the selection
among policies or programs, and in the evaluation of
a policy's or program's effectiveness.
Political use refers to the extent to which a model
has been used explicitly and seriously for essentially
partisan purposes: to delay decisionmaking; to give
symbolic attention rather than real attention to an
issue; to confuse or obfuscate decisionmaking; to de-
feat a specific policy by focusing attention on only
one side of an argument, although the model could
be used to evaluate both sides; to justify or legitimate
a decision already made without the model's results;
and to add the appearance of technical sophistication
to the image or reputation of a policymaker who uses
the model or its results.
We also decided to study only those models that
have become "institutionalized"; that is, integrated as
routine and ongoing components of the policymaking
process, and incorporated into the operations of an
agency. Our research was aimed at determining how
and when four classes of variables affected the success
of model use in policymaking. Figure 1 shows the
general framework for the study and the relationship
between these four classes. The classes of variables
affecting model success (outcomes) can be described
as follows:
1. Environmental Preconditions: availability of fi-
nancial support for modeling, bureaucratic flexi-
bility or rigidity toward adoption of models and
other analytical techniques, and the prevailing bias
of the using agency toward reliance on data-based
arguments in making proposals and arguing for
policies.
2. Organizational Attributes: the characteristics of
both the model developer and user organizations,
including the professional reputation and qual-
ifications of the organizations' technical staffs.
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Figure 1. Research framework.
the orientation of the main users toward either
policy-making or research, and the extent to which
developer organizations involve users in model
construction.
3. Features of the Model Technology: the sophistica-
tion and complexity of the model itself, the data it
requires, and the hardware/software infrastructure
upon which analysis depends; the relative ease of
use of the model package.
4. Transfer Policies: the strategies and policies fol-
lowed by developer and user organizations to move
models and their supporting infrastructure from
the development laboratory to the using organiza-
tion, including direct placement of personnel who
helped develop the model into the using organiza-
tion, and the employment of a deliberate marketing
and support strategy on the part of the developer
organization that incorporates functional division
of labor (e.g., sales, maintenance, customer service)
to apply specialized expertise to transfer problems.
By studying examples of successful modeling, we
were able to determine which of these classes of factors
were influential in achieving success, and the mix of
circumstances and policies that appeared to work
together in accounting for model success.
Data Collection and Analysis Strategy
Our investigation of modeling success involved a lit-
erature review, a reanalysis of data collected in a prior
study (Fromm et al.), and two intensive case studies.
The results reported in this paper are drawn from the
case studies, interpreted according to the literature
reviewed. The purpose of the case studies was to learn
more about the factors that affect model implemen-
tation. We selected two models that had established
success in implementation in federal agencies, and
that had been in use for longer than five years. The
first was the Data Resources, Incorporated (DRI1981)
national macroeconometric model system. This sys-
tem, developed in the late 1960s, was, at the time of
the case studies in the early 1980s, the most widely
used modeling system in the federal government. The
DRI model was exceptionally useful for study because
of its proven record of implementation and its wide
array of services available to users. The second was a
set of two very similar models: the "Transfer Income
Model" (TRIM), and its approximate counterpart the
"Micro Analysis of Transfer to Households (MATH)
model. The TRIM/MATH models are microanalytic
simulation models designed to analyze the eflects of
welfare programs on individuals and households. Both
trace their origins to the RIM model developed during
President Nixon's Commission on Income Mainte-
nance betweeen 1969 and 1971. TRIM was an exten-
sive refinement and elaboration of RIM developed by
the Urban Institute, and was first used in 1973.
MATH was built by individuals who had worked on
TRIM after they moved to Mathemathica Policy Re-
search, Inc. (MPR). Both models are still in use in
several federal agencies. We chose to study both
models because the Urban Institute and MPR pursued
very different methods of marketing and supporting
the models.
Our investigation into the relatively close com-
munity of model experts in the fields of macro-
econometric and microanalytic simulation modeling
led us to other models that provided additional in-
sights. Our study of the DRI model allowed us to
observe, although in less detail, the other major
macroeconometric models such as the Wharton
Economic Forecasting (WEFA) model, the Chase
Econometrics model, and the Federal Reserve's MPS
model. Similarly, we were able to gather information
on two other microanalytic simulation models: the so-
called KGB income transfer analysis model used
within the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS, formerly Health, Education and Welfare); and
the Personal Income Tax Model (PITM) used by the
Treasury Department to analyze tax incidence and
the dynamics of the tax system. None of these other
models were subjected to critical case analysis, and we
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do not suggest that our comments about them are
comprehensive or useful for other than simple com-
parisons. However, these models did provide impor-
tant "calibrating" information for our two primary
studies.
Our case analyses were conducted through a series
of in-depth interviews using the "snowball" sampling
technique, in which successive interviewees point to
new sources of information. Initial contacts were with
the developers and implementation personnel con-
cerned with each of the models, who provided infor-
mation on the models' development, characteristics,
and transfer experiences, as well as lists of the models'
users. These users were then interviewed about their
perceptions of the models, the nature of their uses,
their utility, and the effects of their use on the poli-
cymaking process. The model users pointed us to
further informants, including policymakers (e.g.,
agency heads, division leaders, and politicians), and
analysts (e.g., statisticians, economists, and policy an-
alysts on congressional staffs and within executive
agencies). We further interviewed knowledgeable in-
dividuals who were not related to either the model
developer organization or the user agencies, but who
were familiar with the models, their developers, their
users, and the effects of the models on policymaking.
They were typically academics and former members
of model building or model using groups. The study
methodology is elaborated completely in Kraemer et
al. These case studies are naturally limited in several
respects. They represent only instances of macroecon-
ometric and microanalytic simulation modeling, and
certainly do not comprise the complete history of
either sort of modeling. They are even less generaliz-
able to the intimate details of other sorts of models,
including classical OR models. However, they are very
detailed studies of the application of mathematically
based, computer-dependent and system-analytic mod-
eling techniques in a complex policymaking domain.
As such, they can serve as important analogs of mod-
eling experiences generally. We follow the recommen-
dation of Gass (1983) that those who attempt to
improve the record of OR applications in policy-
making learn from the experiences and lessons of
other fields concerned with building and using com-
plex systems in the fuzzy domain of politics and
policy.
3. Findings from the Research
Types of lj|lodel Use
Model use in federal agencies is governed by two broad
ideologies: a "managerial" ideology and a "political"
ideology (King 1984). These ideologies operate under
different conditions, and any given model use can be
influenced by either ideology, depending on circum-
stances.
A managerial ideology of modeling presumes that
models improve the quality of decisions that emerge
from the policymaking process by enhancing the di-
versity of information available to analysts, managers
and policymakers, and by providing the systematic
means to reduce uncertainty about the future given
certain identifiable assumptions about the present.
More sophisticated modeling systems further provide
detailed if not altogether reliable answers to "what will
happen if... ?" questions.
Many federal agency users of macroeconomic and
microsimulation techniques adhere to a managerial
ideology. For example, they use DRI and other
macroeconomic models to make forecasts of future
states of the U.S. economy, and these forecasts play
an important role in policy formation (McNees 1981,
1982; McNees and Reis 1983). Similarly, agencies
concerned with income transfer programs (the
Congressional Budget Office, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the Department of Health and
Human Services, and the Department of Agriculture)
use MATH or TRIM to make budget projections of
future costs for major entitlement programs in the
welfare system. Forecasting based on current policy
and assumptions about the behavior of key economic
forces is probably the most standard application of
these models. In most agencies, these forecasts are part
of larger information collection processes whereby
analysts attempt to reduce the risk of too-heavy reli-
ance on any single information source.
Another important use of modeling capability in
policy-making is dynamic simulation of the behavior
of policies and programs under different assumptions.
By using simulation, policymakers can predict the
impacts of alternative policy changes and explore how
sensitive particular variables are to alteration. Analysts
also use these techniques to fine-tune policy proposals,
or to determine the mix of program elements (e.g.,
eligibility rules) that would produce a desired program
objective (e.g., total caseload size or total program
cost), by using alternative mixes of various elements
to forecast outcomes of these alternatives. These mod-
eling applications contribute to a larger process of
policy design by enabling analysts to explore the
marginal impacts of alternative policy configurations.
All of these more or less technical applications
of models—for forecasting, for policy simulation
and design, for maximizing available information—
operate smoothly under the managerial ideology of
modeling. They provide extensive, detailed and quan-
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titative information about the costs and benefits of
alternative public policies. Once implemented, they
perform this function relatively efficiently.
However, models can also play a major and quite
different role under the political ideology of modeling.
Policymaking processes produce decisions that affect
who wins and who loses as a consequence of govern-
mental actions. The U.S. government is by design a
political system whose members compete for power
and influence using whatever political weapons they
have at their disposal. Information is an especially
useful weapon in the policymaking process because it
can provide answers to politically relevant questions:
Who will be adversely or positively affected by a
decision, and in what ways? What policy options do
different groups favor or oppose? Information can
also be politically useful to the extent that it is con-
sistent with policymakers' biases and can therefore be
used in arguments to justify particular positions. The
political ideology presumes that models providing
politically useful information will invariably be
used strategically by members of the policymaking
community to achieve political objectives under the
political ideology.
A review of model use by federal agencies reveals
numerous instances of modeling's interacting with
elements of the political and institutional environ-
ment to support a political ideology of model use. In
the early 1970s, for example, welfare analysts noted a
distinct increase in the attention politicians paid to
the results of their microsimulation analyses after the
data were presented in charts showing the breakdown
of income-maintenance program beneficiaries by
congressional district. Analysts began to make routine
reports of the location of the "winners and losers" of
proposed income security program changes in as
much geographical detail as possible. In the long run,
this treatment of data made the information generally
more salient to politicians, and helped to build the
constituency of individuals in favor of a methodology
that could produce such relevant details.
Our case studies revealed several examples of
"counter-modeling," the phenomenon of an agency's
acquiring and using a model different from that used
by their "opponents." Instead of using MATH to
analyze 1976 Food Stamp proposals, the House Ag-
riculture Committee decided to build and use its own
simple, ad hoc forecasting model, and thereby avoid
internal committee fights over whether MATH had
the "liberal" biases the conservatives on the committee
said it had. In 1981, when the Administration brought
in "supply-side" economics as the theoretical justifi-
cation for its new tax and budget program. Adminis-
tration analysts touted a new "supply-side model"
(the Claremont model by John Rutledge of the Clare-
mont Graduate School in California) as a counter
to the traditional Keynesian econometric models
that then dominated the economic modeling scene
in Washington.
Another instance of a political use of modeling is
"accountability modeling," where an agency imple-
ments the same model another agency is using in
order to keep that other agency "honest" by monitor-
ing the information available to the rival agency and
the credibility of the numbers in the reports the rival
agency issues. CBO has cited this approach as one of
the rationales for why it adopted MATH and TRIM
for its income-security analyses: CBO wanted to use
the same models being used at HHS. Similarly, CBO
used the KGB model in 1977 to analyze the Admin-
istration's welfare reform proposals because it wanted
to monitor HHS's estimates using HHS's own tech-
nique and thereby reduce forecasting differences intro-
duced by using different methodologies.
Frequency of Model Use
Not all models are used all of the time, even by
agencies that have fully implemented them. Some
agencies use the DRI model routinely to produce
periodic forecasts of the future states of the economy,
while others use models only during periods of high
interest in an issue. All of the macroeconomic and
microanalytic models we studied can be considered
successfully implemented, since each has been actually
used for managerial or political objectives by at least
one agency besides the organization that developed it.
However, models that are used frequently give the
impression of greater implementation success. The
Treasury's PITM model may be the most heavily used
of all major microsimulation models, with between
1,000 and 1,500 runs per year for over a decade.
Among the models used for broader analytical appli-
cations, the macroeconomic models as a class seem
more successfully implemented than the TRIM and
MATH models, since the former are run more often
and are used by a wider number of federal agencies.
But frequency of use alone can be a misleading indi-
cator of success because it depends upon a number
of independent variables, such as the level and kinds
of resources available for modeling, the importance of
the particular issue being studied, and the ability of
the model to produce information relevant to analyz-
ing or solving a particular problem. Thus, it takes a
mixed set of measures to evaluate the nature of model
implementation success.
To this end we developed a matrix to characterize
contextual factors that affect patterns of agencies' use
of computerized planning models (Figure 2). The axes
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Figure 2. Patterns of use of selected models across
federal agencies in 1981-1982.
represent relationships between characteristics of
models and the modeling environment. The horizon-
tal axis denotes the frequency with which the system
being simulated in the model is an intensely salient
issue in the national policy agenda. At one end are
issues of high, continuous saliency, such as the con-
dition of the U.S. economy, or the composition and
size of the annual federal budget. At the other end of
the continuum are issues that are more episodic in
nature, being highly salient only at certain times—
such as efforts to enact or revise welfare policies—and
less important in the national policy agenda at other
times.
The vertical axis of Figure 2 represents another
major characteristic of model techniques, the breadth
of acceptance for particular models within the com-
munity of model users. Some models, such as the
DRI, Chase and Wharton macroeconomic models and
the PITM, MATH and TRIM microsimulation
models, are relatively old and well-established, and
have a strong clientele of users. These are the models
used most often within their respective policy analysis
arenas. In contrast, at the other end of the continuum,
are models that are relatively new, undergoing signifl-
cant change, poorly documented, and used by few
agencies. The clientele for these models is small, as is
the case for the Claremont model of the U.S. economy
or the KGB microsimulation model.
When the models we investigated are plotted on the
matrix, the pattern indicates frequency of use of in-
dividual models over time and relative to use of other
competing models. A cluster of macroeconomic
models (i.e., DRI, Chase, Wharton) enjoys routine,
continuous use by a large community of agency ana-
lysts. The PITM model is heavily used, but only within
one agency. Others (e.g., MATH) have strong, broad
support among many agencies' analysts, but they are
used mainly during erratic episodes of high interest in
the policy issue they simulate. Models like the Clare-
mont model have a narrow base of support and enjoy
routine use only under extraordinary environmental
conditions (i.e., the rise to power of supply-side econ-
omists in the Reagan Administration during the
budget process for FY 1981). We believe that models
that are frequently used and broadly supported are
more likely than others to become institutionalized as
regular features of the policy analysis process.
Institutionalization of Modeling
While the actual use of a model at least once by an
agency is a minimum measure of implementation
success, a more comprehensive measure is what we
call the institutionalization of models and of modeling
per se. Successful model implementation in this
broader sense is the result of a complicated coexistence
and interaction of "demand pull" by agencies for
modeling resources and a strong "supply push" by
modelers for transfer of specific models. Over the past
two decades, these forces have resulted in the institu-
tionalization of certain models and certain kinds of
modeling in U.S. federal agencies. At the same time,
signiflcant barriers to model transfer and use continue
to exist for many agencies. Modelers who are able
to reduce these obstacles seem to experience greater
implementation success.
We find that increasingly widespread use of com-
puterized planning models has led to several interest-
ing impacts on the policymaking process that are
worth noting.
Demand-Pull for Modeling. Federal agencies' de-
mand for computerized planning models and the
quantitative information they generate is high and has
been strong for some time. Agencies have bolstered
their in-house analytic staffs, increased their use of
outside consultants, and expanded their use of sophis-
ticated analytic techniques. Strong demand for all the
components of the modeling "package" (models,
model experts and input information) to be used either
as technical tools or political weapons has led to great
investment in the development of policy-relevant
models and trained personnel, as well as the transfer
and use of models in the policy-analysis process.
Some federal agencies have had more experience
and greater success than others in building their ana-
lytic capabilities and using them effectively. We found
that agencies' opportunities for and interest in imple-
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menting policy models result to a large extent from
two external political factors: the saliency of the policy
area that constitutes an agency's mission, and the
nature of competition among actual and potential
model users.
The saliency factor affects model implementation
in several ways. At any given time, sudden, intense
national political interest in an issue tends to increase
the resources available to the relevant federal agencies
trying to solve these problems. Such interest focuses
external attention on how particular policies or pro-
grams are doing and on how alternative approaches
might improve the situation. For example, sharp in-
creases in the number of Food Stamp participants in
1974 and 1975 led to demands for reform. The Food
and Nutrition Service (FNS) canie under pressure to
estimate what future caseloads and costs were likely
to be, and to generate proposals for reform. FNS
needed quantitative information for both managerial
and political purposes, and it needed this information
fast, since focused, intense political interest tends to
reduce the time an agency has to investigate a problem
and come up with solutions. Political crises demand
a response, if only an appearance of action in the form
of studying the problem. At such times, agencies often
react by channeling resources toward rapid informa-
tion collection and analysis, and for acquiring exper-
tise (either on the staff or off) to give that information
credibility. In the case of FNS, this need meant con-
ducting new ad hoc surveys of the Food Stamp clien-
tele, contracting for the development of a Food Stamp
module for the MATH model, and supporting staff
and management time necessary to develop rapidly a
computing capability and to use MATH for policy
analysis and political evidence.
Federal agency responses to hot political issues are
also shaped by the nature of political competition
among the participants engaged in analysis and policy-
making. FNS needed quantitative evidence because
program critics (i.e., in the media, in OMB, and on
Capitol Hill) had numbers they were using to attack
the program, and, since FNS did not have such de-
tailed numbers, it was at a political disadvantage.
Acquisition of a number-generating capacity would
bring FNS to equal footing, but to maneuver into a
position of strength, FNS was eager to fmd a way to
get "better" numbers (e.g.. Where did program recip-
ients live? How much money would individual
congressional districts lose as a result of changes?).
Generating such numbers was a costly and technically
problematic proposition, but the political heat enabled
FNS to justify the effort.
The FNS modeling efforts are an example of a larger
model implementation sequence we observed among
competing types of organizations within discrete pol-
icy areas. In any given issue area, the first agency to
implement a model is usually the one with the primary
programmatic responsibility in that area. This orga-
nization is drawn by strong managerial and political
objectives to acquire data analysis and policy simula-
tion capabilities, and often even provides support for
model development or for revising existing research
models to meet more applied policy analysis needs.
These lead agencies then contract with a dedicated
outside modeling agency to provide the service they
need (as the FNS did with MATH), or bring the model
in-house and use it independently (as HHS did with
TRIM). This pattern has emerged in the use of both
microsimulation and macroeconomic models.
Agencies that later adopt and use these models do
so in part because the lead agency in that policy area
has already adopted the modeling capability. These
second-stage model implementers often want models
predominantly for political objectives. Information—
particularly detailed quantitative evidence generated
by sophisticated techniques—is a powerful weapon,
especially if one participant has it and the other does
not. So when one agency has a model, its competitor
has a strong political incentive to seek parity by ac-
quiring a modeling capability for itself. Thereafter,
model-generated information becomes one of the
standard pillars of evidence in policy debates in that
area. The political competition at the heart of the
policymaking process works together with a strong,
generalized demand for "objective" or quantitative
evidence to encourage the spread and institutionali-
zation of modeling among agencies of the federal
government.
Supply Push for Modeling. Of course, model devel-
opers and vendors are not neutral bystanders in this
process. Historically, agencies' strong "demand pull"
for information and for techniques of analysis has
been matched by a powerful "supply push" by mo-
delers for model implementation. The behavior and
practices of individual modelers who are oriented
towards policy applications—not to mention com-
merical success—of their models have greatly influ-
enced the spread of modeling generally, and especially
the implementation success of those individual
models.
Our study revealed that modelers who are more
strongly motivated by economic incentives (as op-
posed to scholarly interests) develop a more aggressive
strategy in seeking consumers for their models. They
seek out agencies that will not only support model
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development and acquisition, but also actually imple-
ment and use a model over time. These modelers set
as their goal the sale of their goods and services to
agency users. They adopt policies that encourage
transfer, such as an orientation toward servicing
clients' needs, designing a comprehensive package of
wares, and promoting and pricing the package to
obtain customers.
In our study, DRI stands out as an archetype of the
successful user-oriented modeler. DRI is a private,
commercial firm, established to sell products (i.e.,
access to its models, forecasts, and data bases) to
paying customers. DRI's principals designed its serv-
ices with the user in mind, combining a wide array of
models, data bases, and consulting services into a
simple-to-use package, priced to attract a large set
of government and corporate users. DRI organized
its personnel into specialized teams whose primary
responsibility has been to market the package and
provide assistance to specific clients. DRI has contin-
uously revised and upgraded its product line and the
quality of its services to meet the demands of its
important customers. It has allowed for lateral move-
ments of personnel to and from user organizations
and academic institutions, and has maintained good
relations and contacts across a wide range of organi-
zations, as well as keeping apprised of the changing
needs of users. This approach has enabled DRI to
adapt its services to the changing political, economic
and technological environment in which its customers
operate. Key factors in DRI's success in transferring
its model to a wide clientele in Washington and in
realizing the goal of actual agency use are the com-
mercialization of its modeling enterprise (for which
DRI is largely responsible) and DRI's adoption of the
previously noted transfer strategies.
Among microsimulation modelers, MPR and its
MATH model had achieved the greatest implemen-
tation success among a diverse set of agencies. Like
DRI, MPR is a private consulting firm offering a user-
oriented product package, as well as customized mod-
eling services. MPR's most effective transfer policies
have accounted for the need to adjust the process of
implementation to the complexity of the technique
itself. Because MATH is so complicated and time-
consuming to learn to use, MPR has developed im-
portant strategies to overcome this barrier, such as a
subscription service containing a standard, low-priced
model, accompanied by user-oriented documentation,
training and consultation. More importantly, MPR
has adopted a policy of "personal transfer" which
encourages trained personnel to move between
modeler and user organizations and among user
agencies.
The strong "personalized transfer" policies of the
organizations involved in microsimulation modeling
have helped spread expertise and thus understanding
of and interest in such modeling across a wide range
of organizations. However, personalized transfer pro-
vides a fragile base of support for modeling in the
income-transfer policy areas as compared to the highly
institutionalized base that exists among organizations
engaged in macroeconomic modeling. This difference
is due to the fact that particular microsimulation
models are usually focused on narrow policy issues
(e.g., income transfer policy) which are the domain of
just a few agencies and which tend to be episodic in
their political saliency.
Interaction of "Demand Pull" and "Supply Push" for
Modeling. Thus, from the 1960s to the 1980s, a num-
ber of factors had converged in Washington, D.C., to
foster the implementation of computerized planning
models among federal agencies. "Supply push" factors
associated with modelers' work interacted well with
the agencies' "demand pull" for quantitative analyses,
facilitating the process of implementing models for
use in actual policy analysis. By the mid-1970s, models
had become institutionalized, routine fixtures of the
policy analysis process. Indeed, the period from the
late sixties through the mid-seventies was the golden
age of policy analysis, with administrators eager to
adopt more systematic management techniques and
quantitative tools for program analysis. Politicians
wanted to know hard facts about how federal
programs were doing and what the impacts of their
decisions might be.
Within the welfare policy arena, this situation trans-
lated into demands for estimates of the costs of and
number of people served by social support programs,
as well as evidence on the status of the "war against
poverty." The seventies were a period of intense con-
cern over the effectiveness of the nation's large, com-
plex and costly welfare system, and how to reform it.
This interest in and controversy over welfare reform
combined with a generalized thirst for systematic pol-
icy analysis to make microsimulation modeling an
attractive tool for social welfare policy analysis in
Washington.
In the macroeconomic policy arena, the demand
for and supply of analytic techniques also interacted
to spread macroeconometric models across the ter-
rain. A number of circumstances enabled modeling
capabilities to become available for policy use. Econ-
ometric research had developed numerous macro-
economic models. The creation of major economic
data bases served as inputs to the models, while ad-
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vanced computing capability allowed for the construc-
tion of more complex models and the ability to process
huge time series data files. In the late sixties, a handful
of senior economists with an entrepreneurial bent and
considerable experience in giving advice to federal
policymakers recognized the existence of this growing
public market for economic information and analytic
services, and established private for-profit firms dedi-
cated to providing services to federal economic ana-
lysts. These analysts were eager to gain the ability to
make credible economic forecasts and simulations of
fiscal and monetary policy options, and thus the "sup-
ply push" and "demand pull" factors began to interact
in this arena as well.
Barriers to Successful Model Implementation
In spite of the evidence for a gradual move toward
increased reliance on modeling, we see several political
and technological obstacles to broader implementa-
tion of models. We have identified four types of
barriers: complexity of the modeling system and its
use; problems with the data; perceived inaccuracies of
the model; and little relevance of results for policy-
making.
The more complex the computerized modeling sys-
tem is from the user's perspective, the greater the
difficulties associated with model transfer and use.
Complex systems are harder to learn to use and pose
numerous operational problems; thus, many users of
models cite model complexity as the largest obstacle
in the implementation process.
Curiously, there appears to be a paradox in agencies'
attraction to complex models. Many users want
models that are technically sophisticated in order to
achieve certain managerial objectives (e.g., to simulate
the behavior of complex systems, such as the effects
of changes in Food Stamp policy on tax and welfare
programs) and political purposes (e.g., building credi-
bility of economic forecasts through the use of state-
of-the-art analytical techniques). Many agencies seem
attracted to particularly complex systems, yet they
discover that this very attribute actually prevents them
from controlling the technology promptly or effi-
ciently after model acquisition. The MATH model,
for example, requires a 2-year investment in personnel
training time to become competent to operate the
system independently. This high learning cost has
often meant that agencies either "use" MATH long
before transferring it in-house (through the assistance
of MPR's staff who run it at MPR) or attempt to hire
MATH analysts away from MPR or other user agen-
cies. In either case, the new user agency cannot gain a
sense of control over this complex methodology until
either the new employee is socialized into the life of
the organization, or existing personnel become suffi-
ciently competent to take over operation of the
modeling exercise.
The complexity of computerized microsimulation
models such as MATH and TRIM seems to limit the
spread of the technology to new users. In contrast, the
major econometric models, although complex, often
have sophisticated software routines that make their
use relatively straightforward. DRI is particularly so-
phisticated in this regard, and many subscribers to
DRI services report that one of its greatest selling
points lies in its ease of use.
Problems with the quality and usability of data
processed and generated by computerized planning
models may be retarding expanded implementation
of models. Critics of the MATH/TRIM microsim-
ulation models, for example, have cited data problems
such as unrepresentativeness of samples, invalid re-
sponses, and old or missing data, as significant draw-
backs to policymakers' reliance on the results of model
runs (GAO 1976). Microsimulation modelers agree
that these problems exist, but they argue that most of
them result not from the microsimulation methodol-
ogy, but from the high costs and reporting difficulties
associated with the collection of large, detailed samples
of U.S. households—problems that are common to
all disaggregated analyses of the behavior of the pop-
ulation affected by complex phenomena. Given the
market that exists for analyses of this population, they
contend, microsimulation models do the best job they
can of processing the huge data sets required to obtain
representative samples of the population at risk.
The accuracy and utility of model results have to
do with the quality of the data processed, the design
of the model itself (i.e., the structural relationships
among variables), and the end users' belief in the
model's accuracy. Thus, another barrier to successful
implementation can be raised when potential users of
the information they generate believe the results are
biased.
Our research leads us to conclude that any time
model results are used in policy disputes or political
battles, some partisans are going to be suspicious of
the objectivity of the model. However, even in the
context of non-politicized policy modeling, model
objectivity can be a problem for users.
The issue of perceived model bias is critical for two
reasons. First, models' actual predictive accuracies are
difficult, if not impossible, to determine because the
systems they simulate tend to be dynamic. Forecasts
of complex economic and social phenomena can ac-
tually change the behavior of the participants in the
system modeled, thereby reducing the "accuracy" of
the original forecast. In such cases, it is difficult to
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know whether the error resulted from the modeled
system's response to the information provided by the
forecast, or from faults in the forecasting model's
design, or both. Moreover, although the policymaking
community is interested in the accuracy of various
computerized planning models, specific organizations
rarely care enough to fund thorough assessments of
the accuracy of model forecasts. For example, criti-
cisms of the major commercial econometric models
abounded after their well-publicized failure to predict
the radical changes in energy prices in the early 1970s;
yet this resulted in neither a widespread rejection of
these models nor a concerted effort to investigate the
predictive accuracy of individual models.
Perceived bias in model forecasts hinders model
implementation in a second, more political way. An-
alysts and policymakers who strongly believe that a
model reflects a particular economic theory or politi-
cal perspective will reject or discredit it if they do not
share the same views. Our study further indicated that
even potential users who wanted to utilize a model
that was reputedly biased in line with their own views
often decided against using it because they expected
their political opponents to discredit any results
produced by the model.
A final obstacle to model use has to do with analysts'
and policymakers' acceptance of model-generated in-
formation as relevant to their own analytic or decision
processes. Analysts work with numbers and models
on a routine basis, and tend to be strongly supportive
of modeling as a key component in their work. How-
ever, analysts in the federal policymaking scene are
bound by the same practical political realities faced
by their politically oriented supervisors: that political
survival depends on winning in policy debates. There
is no room for ambiguity or the appearance of inde-
cisiveness. Thus, politicians desire point estimates in-
stead of range estimates; answers to "what will..."
questions, not "what might..." questions. Lengthy
explanations of why a model's estimate is not com-
pletely reliable do not make the politician more secure
in use of those estimates. An analyst working for a
political person typically will not make use of a model
unless it can provide concrete assistance in answering
the questions of interest to the policymaker. If the
model does not do so, the analyst's input will be
irrelevant and ignored. Under such conditions, sup-
port for modeling in the policymaking organization
will break down.
From our case studies, it appears that microsimu-
lation models that are focused on one specific pro-
gram, such as the PITM model, are the most likely to
capture and hold the interest of agency policymakers.
These models relate directly to issues that interest
agency leaders; use data bases developed and main-
tained by the agency itself (and in which the agency
has confidence); and are often buffered from political
warfare because of their narrow, embedded role in the
analyses of their home agency. The more generalized
policy models are less likely to be met with such
immediate trust. MATH and TRIM modelers recog-
nized this issue soon after the models were introduced
to federal agencies. To overcome this problem, these
modelers began to produce the results of policy sim-
ulations in a format that elected officials could more
easily grasp. They produced "winners and losers"
tables indicating the location and socioeconomic sta-
tus of groups likely to be affected by different policy
changes, so that politicians can learn how their own
constituents might be harmed or benefited by policy
changes, in addition to hearing about overall program-
matic or budget impacts. Yet such politicized use of
these models has required modelers to attach qualifiers
to their model-generated results and explain their
models' inherent limitations to policymakers who
want to know a "true" or "exact" answer to some
question of political importance. This fact may be
unacceptable to policymakers, who do not want their
answers "contaminated" by qualifiers or possible es-
timating errors—even if the questions they ask are
vague and the model methodologies are incapable of
producing error-free estimates.
Impacts of Modeling on the Policymaking
Process
Our study reveals that computerized planning models
have a solid footing in Washington, D.C., model-
generated "evidence" is now part of the standard
vocabulary of policy debates. Models have been insti-
tutionalized in agencies throughout the federal govern-
ment, and analysts strongly believe that at present
there are no better tools to help them provide the
information policymakers want.
One reason that computerized planning models are
here to stay is that most of the actors involved in the
modeling-for-policy analysis enterprise have a stake
in keeping models on board. Obviously, modelers
have commercial, intellectual, and professional inter-
ests in designing usable models and selling them to
analysts and policymakers. Analysts as a group show
a strong commitment to modeling, because it tends
to make their jobs more stimulating and enhances
their organizational status. Policymakers appreciate
the information that models provide, whether it be for
decisionmaking purposes or as ammunition for polit-
ical battles. Although policymakers and analysts are
sometimes cynical about the accuracy of models' es-
timates, they nonetheless support model use because
they believe that if they do not use models and argue
in numerical terms, their opponents will. In politics,
"some numbers beat no numbers every time." In such
a system, all of the participants have a stake in keeping
modeling going, and no one can afford to take an
isolated stand as an objector to the numbers game.
This issue is important because computerized plan-
ning models are clearly powerful techniques in terms
of technology, economics, and politics. These are
sophisticated methodologies capable of processing and
analyzing enormous, complex data bases. Models en-
able their users to produce information that can re-
duce uncertainty about the future, which in turn gives
modelers and analysts personal and organizational
power in the form of specialized knowledge. It also
gives the organizations that control the models a re-
source with high political utility that can be used to
promote narrow organizational goals.
Computerized planning models also represent a
significant amount of political and economic power
for those who benefit directly from the sale and use of
these costly tools, especially since not all groups in a
policy war can afford to acquire or implement them.
Individual agencies' estimates of the cost of using one
model for one year show the magnitude of the invest-
ment: CBO reportedly spent over $ 1 million on DRI
services in 1980; HHS apparently spent $ 1 million of
computer time alone using the KGB model during
1977 (Kraemer et al.). These expenditures are the tip
of the iceberg of the costs of computerized modeling,
an enterprise strongly supported by agencies of the
federal government and showing signs of becoming
more institutionalized over time.
Conclusion
Perhaps the real lesson from our study is that the
evolution of model use depends on many factors, the
most important ones being the presence of the means
to do modeling and the desire of bureaucrats and
politicians to use model-generated information. Sur-
prisingly, however, our study indicates that the most
critical supply factors only enable the adoption of
modeling—they do not ensure that modeling will
occur. Demand factors provided to be the important
variables in explaining whether, how and why mod-
eling was adopted.
Demand for modeling has been a key to model
success in the U.S. experience. Even before agencies
had computerized planning models to generate fore-
casts and develop policy simulations, there was a
strong demand among U.S. government and private
organizations for improving quantitative analysis
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skills. When DRI assembled its service company to
meet the needs of private organizations, it was well-
placed for the sudden and explosive growth in demand
for modeling by federal agencies. The infrastructure
for microsimulation modeling was nonexistent in U.S.
federal agencies when the Presidential Commission
on Income Maintenance needed a technique to help
forecast demand for social services and to simulate
the effects on demand of changes in welfare program
rules, so an applied modeling effort was mounted
to attempt to equip the organization with needed
analytical techniques.
Where the means to do modeling were weak but
the desire to use models was strong, government agen-
cies invested heavily in the creation of new modeling
efforts. If government interest in using models were
to wane, either because models failed to show suffi-
cient practical utility or they failed to retain their
political potency as weapons, it is doubtful that efforts
by modeling suppliers could sustain the modeling
market.
We think modeling is here to stay and that the use
of models will continue to grow. The demand for
models is sustained by the fact that modeling as a
science and art is becoming more refined, thus result-
ing in models that are better able to provide genuine
analytical assistance to those in difficult planning sit-
uations. As long as models continue to prove their
value as useful tools for planning, their political po-
tency as weapons in debate will remain (Kraemer
1985). However, whenever models eventually prove
to be no better than guesswork, the demand for models
will eventually wane and disappear because their prac-
tical and political value cannot be sustained. This
observation brings us back to the fundamental fact
that modeling technology must provide genuine prac-
tical value to its users if it is to survive and persist in
use. In the end, the fate of models is not decided by
the nature of model providers, or the political needs
of model users. Models survive or die based on their
ability to help policy analysts and policymakers choose
appropriate courses of action from among many com-
plicated alternatives. High pressure sales tactics from
modelers, as well as flagrant political uses of models
by politicians, can catapult a model to stardom, but
unless the model can prove its value on the hard
ground of forecasting and simulation, its brightness
will be short-lived.
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